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Diverting young offenders from crime in Ireland 
The need for more checks and balances on the exercise of police discretion 
 
Philip Smyth*    
 
 
Abstract  
 
The Irish police (the Garda Síochána) have been exercising their law enforcement 
discretion to pursue a diversionary strategy for young offenders since at least 1953. 
Working in a street environment of low visibility they have managed to expand their 
traditional law enforcement function into territory more appropriately reserved for 
courts, social workers and probation officers. This article charts the development of 
this expansion and examines its current manifestation in the juvenile diversion 
programme. It argues that the welfare benefits for the young offenders are being 
purchased at the cost of due process rights, and that there is a need for more custom 
built accountability checks and balances to strike a better balance in the programme. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The police have a significant role as the ‘gatekeepers’ of the juvenile justice system 
[11, 41, 44]. They are the first point of contact a juvenile offender has with the 
system. While it is arguable that the treatment of juvenile delinquency is outside the 
proper remit of the police, there is a general acceptance that the police function 
encompasses the detection of delinquency and the triggering of the formal treatment 
process [28, 44, 57, 69]. Discretion has a key role to play in this process. The police 
have traditionally used informal, non-court methods when dealing with very minor 
offenders. Depending on the nature of the offence, they have always had the option of 
dealing with the offending youth by means of a caution, rather than initiating a 
prosecution. The police caution was extended with the introduction of the juvenile 
liaison scheme which provides a variety of options for dealing with juvenile offenders 
[36]. Generally, these entail the exercise of broad discretionary powers on a daily 
basis by officers acting beyond their traditional enforcement function, and in 
conditions of low visibility. How those discretionary powers are used by the police is 
an important factor affecting a young person’s future [21, 54]. This, in turn, 
emphasises the importance of appropriate methods of police governance and 
accountability in juvenile justice.   
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This article examines how the current juvenile liaison scheme facilitates the 
expansion of the police role into territory more appropriately reserved for courts, 
social workers and probation officers, and the threat that that poses to the due process 
rights of young offenders. It argues that there is a need for more custom built 
accountability checks and balances to offset this threat. It begins by outlining key 
aspects of the manner in which the police managed to usurp judicial and welfare 
functions in the treatment of young offenders. 
 
The expansion of the police function 
Since the inception of the modern police force up to the early part of the nineteenth 
century, deviant youths found committing trivial offences were often dealt with 
informally on the spot and on the street by way of the “constabular rebuke or cuff” 
[57]. The Metropolitan Police Act of 1839 extended the categories of trivial offences 
that might attract police attention to include persons found in a “public place flying a 
kite, playing any game to the annoyance of the inhabitations or passengers, or making 
a slide in the snow” [40; ss.46,47,49,54]. While the legislation identified the type of 
offender that a policeman might arrest, it also left the officer considerable discretion 
to determine whether a person came within one or another or any of the defined 
categories [37]. This discretion was broad enough to encompass the administration of 
a caution as an alternative to arrest. Moreover, the occasional police officer would 
also act outside this discretion form time to time by resorting to the technically 
unlawful ‘clip around the ear, ‘the flick of a policeman’s rolled cape’ or the 
confiscation of ‘toys, marbles or hoops’ [17, 45].1 Indeed, the first record of a police 
caution was in 1833, some four years after the establishment of the Metropolitan 
Police force, and it wasn’t until 1853 that official police policy was changed to 
encourage informal warnings for minor offences [58; pp.54-55].  
 
Prior to 1908 the police were most reluctant to bring juvenile offenders suspected of 
minor offence, before the ordinary courts, as they were unsuitable for children [37]. 
Since there were few formal legal distinctions between the trial and punishment of 
adults and children in those days, the latter would often find themselves in the 
                                               
Teaching Assistant, School of Law, University of Limerick. 
1
 According to Denver’s Judge Ben B. Lindsey, the foremost juvenile court promoter, the police dealt 
with boys “based on a doctrine of fear, degradation, and punishment.” [35].  
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company of hardened criminals on remand or in prison. Such an environment had the 
propensity to ruin childhood innocence through the transmission of adult vices and 
become a stepping stone to a life of crime [39]. This was compounded by the lengthy 
pre-trial detention of juveniles, even for very trivial offences. Becker remarked that 
“one of the most crucial steps in the process of building a stable pattern of deviant 
behaviour is likely to be the experience of being caught and publicly labelled a 
deviant” [6; p.31]. The acquisition of a formal criminal record is generally 
acknowledged to be a critical threshold in the development of delinquency [6, 32; 
pp.9-10, 34, 59]. Criminologists who subscribe to this view point to the court 
appearance as the key event. They see this official intervention as the catalyst or spark 
that ignites a delinquent career [6, 32; pp.9-10, 34, 59]. Official sanctions also affix 
negative or stigmatising labels to youthful deviants with predictable negative 
consequences [1, 6, 7, 19, 29, 30, 34, 55]. Therefore the longer the offender can be 
kept away from official intervention, the easier it may be to divert him from a 
criminal career [42; 49; para.9.5, 72; 73]. Certainly there is strong evidence for the 
proposition that: 
… juvenile offenders who can be diverted from the criminal justice system at 
an early stage in their offending are less likely to reoffend than those who 
become involved in judicial proceedings [71; p.12]. 
It follows that there is merit in the exercise of police discretion to divert young 
offenders away from proceedings which, no matter how informally they may be 
conducted, continue to be ‘criminal’ [64, 71; p.12]. 
 
The juvenile liaison scheme can be traced back to the practice of oral police 
cautioning of young offenders for relatively trivial offences. When a police officer 
administered a caution he would usually follow it up by keeping in touch with the 
young person, and  by enlisting the co-operation of his family, his school and relevant 
statutory and voluntary social services with a view to diverting him away from 
offending in the future [51; para.139]. The scheme itself was initiated in these islands 
as a result of a special request from the chief education officer of the borough of 
Liverpool (England) in 1952 and continued as a police service of home visitation in 
response to requests from parents and headmasters [36].2 
                                               
2
  “As the police desire to share in the treatment reaction to crime grew, there developed first in the 
United States the idea that individual police departments should undertake some form of delinquency 
prevention and treatment. The development, in 1925, of the Berkeley, California, Police Department’s 
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Cautioning was first introduced to Ireland in 1953 [56]. Ten years later, following the 
visit (of a month) by two members of An Garda Siochana to Liverpool [56], the 
juvenile liaison scheme was commenced. Initially, it was confined to the Dublin 
Metropolitan Area, and was not launched nationwide until 1981 [2; para.4.1]. In 1991, 
it was supported by the establishment of the Garda National Juvenile Office, and its 
remit was extended to juveniles up to 18 years of age and a wider range of offences 
[66; p.24]. Nevertheless, it continued to operate on a purely administrative, as distinct 
from a statutory, basis. Its function was focused on preventing a court appearance for 
the majority of first offenders and sought to divert them from the path of criminality.  
Under the scheme, an offender who came into contact with the police for an eligible 
offence was released, provided that he had not previously come to the attention of the 
police, he admitted the offence or accepted responsibility for it and the injured party 
indicated no objection to him being cautioned. No decision was taken at this point as 
to the offender’s ultimate disposition. The Juvenile Liaison Officer would make a 
recommendation after assessing the young person’s suitability for caution and 
determining his home condition and his schoolteacher’s opinion. The primary options 
were an informal caution, a formal caution and a prosecution. The recommended 
disposition made its way up the hierarchical police structure to a chief superintendent 
who made the final decision. Shanley explained that this “stay of execution” afforded 
the officer an opportunity to view the case more objectively, thereby reducing the 
“effects of the prejudices and impressionistic judgments” which can affect the manner 
of disposition made at the initial encounter between the police officer and the 
offending youth [56]. 
 
Some fourteen years after its inception, a total of 11,413 juvenile offenders had been 
cautioned, despite the scheme not operating country wide [10; p.24]. In other areas a 
more informal type of supervision was applied by local Gardaí. A two year study in 
the early 1970’s found that participants in the scheme had a lower than normal rate of 
recidivism, except in Limerick, and that appearances in the Dublin Metropolitan 
Children’s Court were reduced by 22% for boys and by 32% for girls in the first year 
of its operation [31; p.13]. The introduction of the scheme also coincided with a 
                                                                                                                                       
Crime Prevention Division can probably be considered as the forerunner of most present day police 
activities in this area.” [5; p.404].  
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reduction in the number of cases dismissed under the Probation of Offenders Act 
1907. Critically, it would appear that the operation of the scheme was heavily 
coloured by Garda discretion, which Shanley noted was the ‘hallmark of the system of 
formal cautioning in both England and Ireland.’[56] In some areas very few first 
offenders were admitted, while in others all first offenders were admitted. It was a 
matter for the police to decide whether an individual offender was referred to the 
scheme or not. It is important to note, however, that this exercise of discretion was not 
confined to the decision on whether to initiate the criminal process. It also entailed 
decisions on the form of punishment or treatment to be applied in circumstances for 
which there was no legal sanction [5].  
 
Indeed, concerns were expressed that the scheme allowed the police to set themselves 
up as prosecutor, judge and executioner of the sentence imposed, thereby removing 
from the offender all the protection and rights afforded by the courts of justice?3  The 
operation of scheme lacked any legal basis or independent mechanism to examine 
what police policies and procedural guidelines if any applied. Despite its introduction, 
the police were still able to act more or less as autonomous agents within the criminal 
justice system, shielded from effective accountability for their disposition of young 
offenders. Furthermore the scheme did not prevent police officers from acting outside 
its provisions as they could continue to exercise, without accountability, the street 
level discretion that they had enjoyed before the scheme was introduced. 
 
The Diversion Programme 
It took until 2001 before the juvenile liaison scheme was placed on a statutory basis 
under the designation of the Diversion Programme [12; pt.4]. As Walsh remarks, this 
was a positive feature from a due process perspective as it meant that the Programme 
would operate officially in accordance with the law [67; p.6]. On the other hand, there 
is reason to believe that it continues to function in many respects along the lines of the 
administrative scheme which it replaced. The Programme’s objective is to divert from 
further offending children, who have accepted responsibility for their criminal 
behaviour [12; s 19(1)]. This is achieved primarily by way of caution and, where 
appropriate, by placing the offender under the supervision of a juvenile liaison officer 
                                               
3
 The comments of a senior probation officer in a discussion held in London in 1959 as quoted in [36; 
p.364]. 
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and the convening of a restorative conference to be attended by the child, members of 
his family and other relevant persons to discuss the child’s offending and 
circumstances and how they might best be addressed [12; s 19(2)]. Despite these 
additional elements and a number of procedural changes, the new Programme 
continues to be dominated by police discretion. Indeed, as Kilkelly remarks, what 
evolves from this new Programme is a process entirely under the control of the police 
acting in an exclusive role separate from judges or other independent officials acting 
in a judicial capacity [33; pp.83-84]. This permits justice to be conducted under a 
cloak of secrecy and reflects a major departure from due process norms. The question 
arises again whether there are sufficient checks and balances to ensure transparency 
and accountability over the policies and procedures employed by the police in the 
Programme. 
 
In 2009, there were 18,519 referrals for inclusion into the programme, and 76% were 
admitted. Of those admitted, 54% were dealt with informally, 21% were dealt with 
formally, 16% were deemed unsuitable, in 6% no further action was deemed 
necessary, and 3% were still pending at the end of the year [3]. While the figures 
reflect a decrease of 14% on the referrals for 2008, the percentages of admissions and 
dispositions do not show any significant changes, apart from a slight drop in the 
administration of formal cautions and a slight increase in the figure for no further 
action. More importantly, neither the figures nor the associated commentary on them 
from sources such as the Committee to Monitor the Effectiveness of the Diversion 
Programme shed much light on the factors that determine the selection of one mode of 
disposition over another; especially the factors that are deemed to render a child 
unsuitable or not in need of any further action. 
 
It is the Director of the Programme who determines eligibility for entry into the 
programme. Significantly, she is and, by statute, must be a police officer. However, 
neither the legislation nor the Director provides transparent criteria that are used to 
base the decision to apply one disposition as opposed to another in any individual 
case. The net effect is that the Director is left with a very broad discretion in her 
administration of the Programme, and she is exercising that discretion in a manner 
that precludes effective accountability. In the absence of detailed published criteria on 
the dispositions, there is no basis on which decisions in individual cases or internal 
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policies can be questioned externally. This creates a scenario in which the police can 
‘cherry pick’ the offenders who are most likely not to re-offend, and abandon the 
lesser prospects to trial in the criminal courts. Should this happen in practice, the 
consequence is that the figures on subsequent recidivism among offenders admitted to 
the Programme would falsely exaggerate its success. The Programme also lends itself 
to ‘net-widening’ of social control by the police [9, 16, 18, 38; p.166].4  In the 
absence of viable accountability checks and balances, the police can use their 
discretion to rein in minor ‘offenders’ who would have been ignored or ‘let off’ in the 
past. This also enhances the risk of arbitrary discrimination against certain individuals 
and classes.  
 
Ultimately, it can be argued that there is a serious mismatch between the objective of 
the Programme to divert young offenders from the path of criminality, and anything 
that can realistically be achieved within the limits of the traditional police role. The 
proper discharge of the Programme’s objective would require the police to combine 
quasi-judicial and social welfare roles with their traditional law enforcement 
functions. Inevitably, this entails an expansion and deepening of police discretion, 
with major consequential risks for the welfare and due process rights of the children 
concerned. Admittedly these risks could be minimised or reasonably managed if the 
exercise of that discretion was subject to transparent and effective accountability 
mechanisms. The Programme, however, is established in a manner that leaves 
excessive operational discretion in the hands of the police. Moreover, it would appear 
that it is managed by the police in a manner that maximises the scope and depth of 
their role in the treatment of young offenders, and minimises the scope for external 
accountability. This can be illustrated by reference to a few key aspects of the 
Programme. 
 
Discretion to choose between diversion and prosecution 
The diversion of juvenile offenders from formal court proceedings is generally rooted 
in a ‘welfare’ based system of juvenile justice. This aims at developing the child’s 
treatment according to his/her response and changing needs, in contrast with the 
                                               
4
 Net widening is a term most commonly used to describe a phenomenon whereby a program is set up 
to divert youth away from an institutional placement or some other type of juvenile court disposition 
but, instead, merely brings more youth into the juvenile justice system who previously would never 
have entered. Instead of shrinking the "net" of social control, one actually "widens" it to bring more in.  
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‘justice’ based system which provides for intervention and sanctions proportional to 
the nature of the offence, even where, as is often the case with juveniles, the offending 
is minor. Indeed, Cohen argues that “diversion becomes not movement out of the 
system but movement into a programme in another part of the system” [13]. Despite 
the ongoing tug of war between the proponents of both systems there is agreement 
that diversion by means of police caution can be a desirable objective [60].   
 
Although diversion is intended to keep an offender out of court, it still entails an 
element of quasi-judicial decision-making on how he will be dealt with in respect of 
his offending [12; pt 4]. The decision-making role, however, is discharged by a police 
officer rather than a judge. Critically, police officers are entrusted with discretionary 
powers that distinguish them from all other players in the criminal justice system [21, 
70]. This is most evident in the context of the diversionary scheme where, unlike 
judges and prosecutors, they exercise their discretionary powers at street level out of 
the purview of public scrutiny. Furthermore without the burden of due process, and 
subject to no review, an individual police officer can effectively acquit an offender by 
exercising his discretion discreetly, through informal action such as a caution or even 
ignoring an offence entirely. In other words, he or she has the power selectively to 
pre-empt the entire course of a criminal prosecution [70]. The capacity for such 
discriminatory enforcement of the law permits the police to redefine justice in their 
own interests and concerns, and that might not necessarily be consistent with the 
priorities of the wider community [22, 47].  
 
Police discretion can also be viewed as a usurpation of the legislative authority of that 
community and their elected representatives. If there are laws that the community 
actually want enforced with discretion then there is no reason why provision for that 
cannot be made by their duly elected representatives in the legislature [47]. 
Responsibility for the enactment, amendment, and repeal of the criminal law 
will not then be abandoned to the whim of each police officer or department, 
but retained where it belongs in a democracy-with elected representatives [24]. 
In practice, police officers exercise a wide range of discretion and power over who 
will be subject to legal intervention and social control. Given the fact that such 
decisions are made on the street, “methodological problems are considerable and 
frequently the subject of criticism” [20]. They do not in the main involve recording 
and are seldom subject to accountability, as the police officers invariably work 
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beyond the reach of direct supervision. It is difficult to account properly for the 
actions of each individual in his or her contacts with young offenders. Informal street 
encounters leave no information records on which the basis for a discretionary police 
decision can be reviewed; a decision which could have lasting consequences for the 
youth concerned. Consistency and objectivity in the exercise of such discretion 
requires transparent and detailed police policies and procedures to guide the officers 
concerned. The absence of guidance facilitates arbitrary police discrimination in the 
determination of who will or will not be subject to prosecution. In this context, the 
development of the statutory Diversion Programme held out the potential for 
objective and transparent criteria to control the exercise of the police discretion guide. 
Unfortunately the opportunity was not taken in the legislative framework for the 
Programme and has not been taken since in its management.  
 
Precondition of admitting guilt 
A fundamental principle underpinning the Diversion Programme is the offender’s 
admission of guilt or acceptance of responsibility for the offence. In the absence of 
this admission, the offender will be excluded from the Programme and routed through 
a prosecution and court appearance. This procedural requirement for a guilty plea 
affords the police an opportunity to override the fundamental principles of justice by 
usurping the jurisdiction of the court and denying the due process rights of the 
offender. It effectively relinquishes his option to avail of a fair trial, the presumption 
of innocence and having the prosecution prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.  It 
creates a situation whereby the police officer can manipulate or cajole the offending 
child into admitting guilt or risk prosecution even in circumstances where the officer 
has little or no evidence on which to base a prosecution [47]. Additionally, the fear of 
a court appearance could also be used as an intimidating or inducing tool by the police 
to obtain an admission of guilt [69]. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the 
admission of guilt could be viewed by the parents of the young offender as a ‘get out 
clause’ to prevent what they may consider an embarrassing or shameful appearance in 
court despite a situation where their child might be completely innocent. Conversely, 
however, there are some parents who might prefer the short, sharp shock of a court 
appearance rather than the protracted participation in the Programme which entails 
home and school visits by the police. In other words, the objection is not to the 
caution, but to the procedure within the scheme which follows the caution. 
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In principle, of course, police discretion to recommend the caution of a juvenile 
offender should not be exercised as a substitute for a weak prosecution case. The 
available evidence must be sufficient to warrant a prosecution on the basis that a 
conviction is more likely than an acquittal. There is a danger, however, that the police 
will fail to apply appropriate unwritten legal criteria in practice as they frequently 
view the caution as a ‘let-off’. 
 
This aspect of the Programme signals a significant departure from due process norms, 
even though its likely consequences are that the offending youth will be subjected to 
constraints on his freedom and autonomy that can exceed those that would have 
applied in the formal criminal process [67]. The “welfare trade off” is that youth does 
not have to suffer the experience of that formal criminal process and is given support 
to avoid retuning to the path of criminality [67]. It should be feasible, however, to 
preserve the advantages of the Programme within a regime that is more conducive to 
due process and transparency [33]. This might be achieved, for example, through the 
formulation and publication of criteria governing admission to, and other pivotal 
decisions within, the Programme, together with the publication of comprehensive 
information on the extent to which the scheme is diverting children away from crime 
[67]. These policies should reflect the international standards on juvenile justice 
which prioritise both the observance of due process and the best interest of the child 
[62; arts 3(1) and 40(2), 63; r 7]. 
 
It is unlikely that the promulgation of statutory and administrative criteria will be 
sufficient in itself to protect the due process rights of the child offender and ensure 
transparency and fairness in the operation of the Diversion Programme. As Dixon 
points out, the relationship between policing and legal rules is seldom straightforward 
[15]. The use of rules can be problematic in any context because of “their tendency 
towards over- or under-inclusiveness, their indeterminacy, and their interpretation” [8; 
p.6]. Rules by nature have an ‘open texture’ because rule makers cannot anticipate all 
possible future events and circumstances to which the rules apply [8; p.11]. Hawkins 
sees discretion as central to the legal order since ‘the complexity of contemporary 
society, the sheer size and burden of the legislative task, and the growing dependence 
upon specialist, technical, or scientific knowledge and expertise’ have meant that 
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legal systems must rely on legal and administrative officials to give effect to the law 
[27; p.12]. Discretion is also an integral part of interpreting legal rules, which are 
never unambiguously and precisely written. On the other hand, the difficulty with 
discretion is the propensity for the police to depart from the unwritten principles and 
standards associated with legality, e.g., consistency, equity, proportionality, due 
process and justice. The task, therefore, is to subject the exercise of police discretion 
in the Programme to effective accountability mechanisms which deliver transparency 
and the opportunity to challenge decisions in individual cases.  
 
Trespassing on the judicial function 
As noted earlier, prior to 1908 the police were reluctant to prosecute children though 
the courts, given the risks inherent in a criminal record and exposure to hardened 
criminals. The establishment of the juvenile court in 1908 went some way towards 
redressing these fears by establishing a separate court for dealing with the juvenile 
offender. Given this option, it is not wholly clear why the police would still opt not to 
prosecute. Indeed the Departmental Committee on the Treatment of Young Offenders 
found the use of informal warnings to be objectionable “usurping the functions of a 
tribunal” and “outside the proper duties of the police” [23; p.30]. The juvenile court 
provided independent and transparent procedural justice which was subject to public 
scrutiny, elements notably absent from discretionary police cautions. With this option 
available within the criminal justice system, what need if any did police have to resort 
to an oral caution or the juvenile liaison scheme to deal with juvenile offenders?   
 
At least part of the answer is that the juvenile court was not always the most 
appropriate option. It still followed a procedure that was highly formal and legalistic 
and it was not bound to take into account the juvenile’s welfare [52; p.70]. Equally, 
however, it would appear that the police did not always have confidence in the court. 
Whitaker suggests that the system of oral cautioning coupled with juvenile liaison 
schemes had found favour with the police “partly because of dislike of the delays of 
the juvenile courts” [68; p.85]. It has also been suggested that some police officers 
thought that the attitude of the court was too “soft” [43; p.424]. In their view, this had 
the effect of familiarising the deviant youth gradually with the “not too unpleasant 
experience of a court appearance”, and a consequent propensity to undermine the 
authority of the court [26; p.70]. On the other hand, there is undoubtedly merit in the 
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police, or some other agency, operating as a filtering mechanism to sift out those 
cases which really need to be dealt with by a court because of factors such: as the 
gravity of the offence in question, the need to uphold the due process rights of the 
child, and the need for specialised treatment that can best be accessed through the 
medium of the court. The sifting mechanism will enable the court to focus its limited 
time and resources on those cases most suited to its distinctive role, while the others 
can be routed through alternative remedial processes.  
A reform on these lines would assign to the courts those cases where a judicial 
decision is expected and required, but would spare from appearance in court  
many of those against whom at present  the court itself thinks best to take no 
action [26; p.128]. 
. 
The problem is that the police have managed to occupy the field of the sifting 
mechanism. They have usurped the key quasi-judicial function of determining 
whether a young offender should be dealt with by the courts or through a non-judicial 
remedial process, despite the fact that the latter usually takes the form of a caution and 
ongoing intervention under the control of the police themselves. Not only does this 
present a clear conflict of interest, but it sucks the police into a role that is more 
properly associated with the court. Unlike the court, however, the police decision-
making in this area lacks transparency and accountability as the final disposition in 
any individual case is not made by an independent adjudicator and is not subject to 
public scrutiny. 
 
Trespassing on the welfare function  
There are several aspects of the Diversion Programme which entail police officers 
discharging the welfare role of social workers and probation officers. The juvenile 
liaison officer, for example typically will make a home visit prior to the disposition of 
the case. This will allow him or her to make an assessment of the potential of parents 
for controlling the future behaviour of the child as well as the juvenile himself and the 
circumstances surrounding the infringement. It is questionable whether this should be 
the role of the police or the function of professional trained social workers. Such visits 
effectively represent an encroachment by the police into the area of welfare which, 
arguably, is outside the remit of a law enforcement agency. It is important to preserve 
the distinction between policing and social work. Police training is orientated towards 
crime and punishment not welfare [61; p.103]. Indeed the liaison officer is first and 
 13 
foremost a police officer and, as such, his primary allegiance is to the police 
organisation rather than the welfare of the juvenile offender. Uglow makes the point 
that while the social worker invades the youth’s privacy he “identifies more closely 
the interest and welfare” of the juvenile offender and the invasion is not as threatening 
as that of the police [61; p.103].  
 
The inherently different perspectives can result in subjective discrimination against 
young offenders from certain social backgrounds. Home visits to offenders from a 
lower socio economic background, for example, might steer police discretion against 
informal cautions as the law enforcement officer might be more inclined to view the 
home circumstances as not conducive to a modification of the offending behaviour. 
School visits by police officers to obtain the teacher’s opinion of the child also present 
problems. The police officer’s role in school visits should be confined to their area of 
expertise; namely to promote understanding of and respect for the law and the 
fostering of good relations between the police and young people. Probing the complex 
psychological, behavioural, learning or domestic problems of a child offender does 
not come within that remit. These aspects should be left to those professionals who 
are specially trained to deal with them. 
 
A further example of the police trespassing into the welfare function arises at the 
supervisory stage of the Programme where the juvenile liaison officer assumes the 
expertise of a Probation officer. This occurs when the young offender has been the 
subject of a formal caution. The supervisory period lasts for 12 months from the date 
of the caution [12; s.27(1)].5 The level of supervision is determined by the juvenile 
liaison officer who is supervising the child having regard to such factors as the 
seriousness of the criminal behaviour, the level of control by the parents, the 
likelihood of committing further offences or where the Director considers it 
appropriate [12; s.28]. There is an argument for incorporating this role under the 
auspices of the probation system and removing it from the police Diversion 
Programme. The advantages of the probation option are succinctly outlined by James 
O’Connor: 
                                               
5
 In exceptional circumstances an offender may be subject to supervision for a period of 6 months 
following an informal caution.   
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The probation system is a valuable means of reforming an offender and has a 
unique feature that the accused person may continue as a member of the 
community, remaining at school or at his work. There is the further advantage 
that the responsibility of reforming an offender is not that of an institution, but 
rests with the offender himself. He must keep up a standard of good conduct 
and obey the conditions of the probation order, and, since this will be all the 
harder to do outside an  institution than within, if he succeeds his reformation 
will almost certainly  be all the more successful and permanent. [42; p.75]   
 
The aims of the probation system are fundamentally similar to those of the 
supervisory role within the Diversion Programme in that they seek to reform the 
offender by dealing with him as a member of the community rather than in an 
institution in the belief he can be successfully and permanently diverted from a life of 
crime. It does not follow, however, that police training is suitable or appropriate for 
this challenge: 
Young offenders were often of extremely low intelligence or emotionally 
maladjusted: police officers, however good their intentions: lacked the special 
training necessary to help those who suffered from such handicaps. Trivial 
offences were often only a symptom of an underlying condition, requiring 
early and specialised treatment, that was revealed only by the full inquires 
made when the child came before a court [51; para.146]. 
 
Conclusion 
The Garda role in diverting young offenders away from the formal criminal process 
is, and always has been, inextricably linked with the discretion that they bring to bear 
in the detection, prevention and prosecution of crime. They have used this 
imaginatively to expand their traditional law enforcement competence in juvenile 
justice to encompass judicial and welfare functions normally discharged by separate 
specialist agencies. Critically they have managed to do this while avoiding many of 
the checks and balances applicable to those agencies. Arguably, they have used their 
discretion to establish and maintain a parallel criminal justice process for young 
offenders which operates beneath the radar of transparency and objectivity applicable 
to the formal criminal process. Part of the problem with such police discretion is that 
it is prone to being used in ways that discriminate (in effect, if not in intent) against 
the poor, powerless, and unpopular in our society [46, 48; pp.106-110].6 This can 
undermine the ‘legitimacy of the law where it is most in need of legitimacy’ [47].  
Although discretion is an inevitable part of policing, it becomes problematic where it 
                                               
6
 For a general overview of the problem and recent attempts to solve it, see [65; ch.2]. 
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is exercised in a manner that lacks consistency and fairness. [44]. It does happen that 
police officers behave differently in similar situations; some willing to take no action 
towards a young offender while others would arrest the same offended regardless of 
the nature of the offence [44]. To promote consistency and fairness in police decision 
making, policies and procedures must be in place to provide guidance to individual 
officers on the appropriate use of their discretionary powers. 
 
The establishment of the Diversion Programme on a statutory basis offered the 
potential to inject a much needed degree of transparency and accountability into the 
discharge of the Garda juvenile justice role. It was reasonable to expect that the 
legislation would introduce greater clarity into the demarcation of the police, judicial 
and welfare remits. Equally it could and should have injected more transparency to 
the operation of the Programme and more effective accountability for the manner in 
which discretion is exercised in individual cases and across the Programme as a 
whole. Unfortunately, the legislation has done little to fulfil these expectations. Nor 
has the Garda management of the Programme done all that it could do to inject greater 
transparency and accountability into it. While there have been some improvements in 
the publication of information and data, these still fall short of what is required. It 
may be, of course, that the provision of internal checks and balances within the police 
management of the Programme will prove incapable of overcoming the ‘cop culture’ 
pressures on officers to support each other’s decision [4, 49, 53]. Ultimately, there 
may be a need to introduce an element of external oversight. 
 
 16 
 
References  
 
1. Adams, M.S., Robertson, C.T., Gray-Ray. P., & Ray, M.C. (2003). Labelling 
and Delinquency, Adolescence, 38, 149. 
2. Annual Report of the Committee Appointed to Monitor the Effectiveness of the 
Diversion Programme. (2004). Dublin: Department of Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform 
3. Annual Report of the Committee Appointed to Monitor the Effectiveness of the 
Diversion Programme. (2010). Dublin: Department of Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform. 
4. Ashworth, A. (1998). The Criminal Process An Evaluative Study. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
5. Barker, B.M., (1965-1966). Police Discretion and the Principle of Legality 
The Criminal Law Quarterly, 8, 400-407. 
6. Becker, H. (1963). Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New 
York: Free Press. 
7. Bernburg, J.G., & Krohan, M.D. (2003). Labelling, Life Chances, and Adult 
Crime: The Direct and Indirect Effects of Official Intervention in Adolescence 
on Crime in Early Adulthood, Criminology, 41(4), 1287-1318. 
8. Black J. (1997). Rules and Regulations. Oxford: Clarendon. 
9. Blomberg, T. (1980). Widening the Net: An Anomaly in the Evaluation of 
Diversion Programs. In Klein, M., & Tielman, K. (eds.). Handbook of 
Criminal Justice Evaluation. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 571. 
10. Burke, H., Carney, C., & Cook, G. (1981). Youth and Justice: Young 
Offenders in Ireland. Dublin: Social Administration Institute. 
11. Carrington, P.J., & Moyer, S. (1994). Trends in Youth Crime and Police 
Response, Pre-and Post-YOA Canadian Journal of Criminology, 36(1) 1-28. 
12. Children Act, 2001. 
13. Cohen, S. (1979). Community Control- A New Utopia. New Society, 609-611. 
14. Ditton, J. (1979). Contrology: Beyond the New Criminology. London: 
Macmillan. 
15. Dixon. D. (1997). Law in Policing Regulations and Police Practices. Oxford: 
Clarendon. 
16. Dunford, F. W. (1977). Police Diversion: An Illusion? Criminology, 15(3), 
335-352. 
17. Emsley, C. (1983). Policing and its Context 1750-1870. London: Macmillan. 
18. Ezell, M. (1989). Juvenile Arbitration: Net Widening and Other Unintended 
Consequences  Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 26(4). 
19. Figueira-McDonough, J. (1979). Processing Juvenile Delinquency in Two 
Cities: A Cross-National Comparison. Journal of Research in Crime & 
Delinquency, 16(1), 114-143. 
20. Fisher, C. J., & Mawby R.I. (1982). Juvenile Delinquency and Police 
Discretion in the Inner -City Area. British Journal of Criminology, 22(1), 63-
75. 
21. Gandy, J.M. (1970). The Exercise of Discretion by the Police as a Decision –
Making Process in the Disposition of Juvenile Offenders. Osgoode Law 
Journal, 8(2), 339-344. 
 17 
22. Garrett, M., & Short, J.F.jnr. (1975). Social Class and Delinquency: 
Predictions and Outcomes of Police –Juvenile Encounters. Social Problems, 
22, 132-142. 
23. Gelsthorpe, L., & Kemp, V. (2003). Youth Justice: Discretion in Pre-Court 
Decision Making. In Gelsthorpe, L., & Padfield, N. (2003). Exercising 
Discretion Decision-Making in the Criminal Justice System and Beyond. 
Cullompton: Willan Publishing. 30. 
24. Goldstein, J. (1960). Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: 
Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice. Yale Law Journal, 
69(4), 543. 
25. Griffin, D. (2005). Restorative Justice, Diversion and Social Control: Potential 
Problems. National Conference on Young People and Crime Research, Policy 
and Practice. Dublin: Centre for Social and Education Research. 
26. Grunhut, M. (1956). Juvenile Offenders Before the Courts. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
27. Hawkins, K. (1992). The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives from Law and 
Social Science. In Hawkins, K (ed.). The Uses of Discretion. Oxford: 
Clarendon. 11-46. 
28. Hoyle, C., & Young, R. (2003). Restorative Justice, Victims, and the Police. 
In Newburn, T. (ed.). Handbook of Policing. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 
680. 
29. Hirschfield, P.J. (2008). The Declining Significance of Delinquent Labels in 
Disadvantaged Urban Communities. Sociological Forum, 23(3), 575-601. 
30. Inniss I., & Feagin, J. (1989). The Black “Underclass” Ideology in Race 
Relations Analysis. Social Justice, 16(4), 13-34. 
31. Irish Times (13th May 1975). 
32. Jones, H. (1963). Policemen as Social Workers.  New Society, 14, 9-11 
33. Kilkelly, U.  (2006). Youth Justice in Ireland: Tough Lives, Rough Justice. 
Dublin: Irish Academic Press. 
34. Lemert, E. (1967). Human Deviance. Social Problems and Social Control. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
35. Lindsey, B.B. (1905). The Boy and the Court. Charities, 13(7), 350-357. 
36. Mack J.A. (1962-1963). Police Juvenile Liaison Scheme. British Journal of 
Criminology, 3, 361-375. 
37. Magarey, S. (1978). The Invention of Juvenile Delinquency in Early 
Nineteenth-Century England. Labour History, 34, 11-25. 
38. Maxwell, G., & Morris, A. (1993). Family Victims Culture, Youth Justice in 
New Zealand. Wellington: Social Policy Agency and Institute of Criminology, 
University of Wellington. 169.  
39. May, M. (2002). Innocence and Experience: The Evolution of the Concept of 
Juvenile Delinquency in the Mid-Nineteenth Century. In, Muncie, J., Hughes, 
G., & McLaughlin, E. Youth Justice, Critical Readings. London: (Sage 
Publications, 98. 
40. Metropolitan Police Act 1938, 2&3 Vict. C.47. 
41. Nowak, B.J. (1994). Variables Impacting the Discretionary Decisions made by 
Juvenile Court Gatekeepers. Dissertation Abstracts International Section A: 
Humanities and Social Sciences, (0419-4209), 54, 2746. 
42. O’Connor, J. (1963), The Juvenile Offender. Studies: an Irish Quarterly 
Review, 52, 69-86. 
 18 
43. Osborough, N. (1965). Police Discretion not to Prosecute Juveniles. Modern 
Law Review, 28(4), 421-431.  
44. Parkert A.L., & Sarre, R. (2008). Policing Young Offenders: What Role 
Discretion? International Journal of Police Science & Management, 10(4), 
474-485. 
45. Pearson, G. (1983). Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears. London: 
Macmillan. 
46. Powell, D.D. (1990). A Study of Police Discretion in Six Southern Cities. 
Journal of Police Science and Administration, 17(1), 1-7. 
47. Reiman, J. (1998). Against Police Discretion: Reply to John Kleinig. Journal 
of Social Philosophy, 29(1), 132-142. 
48. Reiman, J. (ed.). (1998). The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: 
Ideology, Class, and Criminal Justice. Needham, Mass: Allyn &Bacon. 
49. Reiner, R. 3rd ed. (2000). The Politics of the Police. Hemel Hempstead: 
Wheatsheaf. 
50. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Penal System (Whitaker Report). 
(1985). Dublin: Stationery Office. 
51. Report of the Committee on Children and Young Persons. (1960). London: 
Home Office, Cmnd.1191. 
52. Report on the Industrial and Reformatory School System (Kennedy Report). 
(1970). Dublin: Stationery Office. 
53. Sanders, A. (1998). The Limits to Diversion from Prosecution. British Journal 
of Criminology, 28(4), 513-532. 
54. Sarre, R. (2005). Police and the Public: Some Observations on Policing and 
Indigenous Australians. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 17(2), 305-313. 
55. Schissel, B. (2002). Youth Crime, Youth Justice and the Politics of 
Marginalization. In Schissel, B., & Brooks, C. (2002). Marginality and 
Condemnation: An Introduction to Critical Criminology. Halifax: Fernwood 
Publishing. 
56. Shanley, P. (1970). The Formal Cautioning of Juvenile Offenders. The Irish 
Jurist, 5, 262-279 
57. Simpson, J. (1968). The Police and Juvenile Delinquency. British Journal of 
Criminology, 8, 119-129. 
58. Steer, D. (1970). Police Cautioning – a Study in the Exercise of Police 
Discretion. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
59. Tannenbaum, F. (1938). Crime and Community. Boston: Ginn. 
60. Tutt, N. & Giller, H. (1983). Police Cautioning of Juveniles: The Practice of 
Diversity. Criminal Law Review, 585-595. 
61. Uglow, S. (1988). Policing Liberal Society. Oxford New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
62. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989. 
63. United Nations General Assembly. (1985). Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice. New York: United Nations. 
64. United National General Assembly. (1990) Riyadh Guidelines for the 
Prevention of Delinquency. New York: United Nations. 
65. Walker, S. (1993). Taming the System: The Control of Discretion in Criminal 
Justice, 1950—1990.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
66. Walsh, D.P.J. (2005). Juvenile Justice. Dublin: Thomson Round Hall. 
 19 
67. Walsh, D.P.J. (2008). Balancing Due Process Values with Welfare Objectives 
in Juvenile Justice Procedure: Some Strengths and Weaknesses in the Irish 
Approach. Youth Studies Ireland, 3, 3-17. 
68. Whitaker, B. (1964). The Police. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
69. Wolcott, D. (2001). The Cop Will Get You: The Police and Discretionary 
Juvenile Justice 1890-1940. Journal of Social History, 35(2), 349-371. 
70. Wortley, R.K. (2003). Measuring Police Attitudes Toward Discretion. 
Criminal Justice and Behaviour, 30(5), 538-595. 
71. Young Offenders: White Paper. (1980). London: HMSO. 
72. Zimring, F.E. (2000). The Common Thread: Diversion in Juvenile Justice. 
California Law Review, 88(6), 2477-2495. 
73. Zaitsev, G.K., Zaitsev, A.G., Dmitriev, M.G., & Apal’kova, I.I. (2009) 
“Rehabilitation of the Personality of Juvenile Offenders. Russian Education 
and Society, 51(11), 50-60. 
     
   
.  
